Leandro BERTONCELLO

Original title: O Uno além do Ser: a ab-rogação da alteridade em Meister Eckhart

Published in The Kingdom of the Spirit

Keywords: Meister Eckhart, Negatio negationis, Non-dualism.

This article examines the concept of the abrogation of otherness in Meister Eckhart, with emphasis on his doctrine of the union between the human soul and the One, a reality that transcends being. Through the analysis of texts and sermons by the Rhenish mystic, it explores how the soul can overcome all distinctions and attain unity with God through the negation of negation (negatio negationis). The study discusses the transcendence of the One beyond being, the role of the ground of the soul (Grunde der Seele) as the locus of this union, and the dialectic between detachment and love for others. It concludes that abrogation does not imply contempt for the world but rather a new way of experiencing the divine in all creatures.

Julia BUTINYÀ JIMÉNEZ

Original title: El Paradís en Lo somni de Bernat Metge (c. 1340-1413)

Published in Returning to Eden

Keywords: Bernat Metge, Humanism, Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis, Lo somni, Ramon Llull.

The concept of Paradise is analyzed in Lo somni, the great humanist dialogue by the notary of the chancellery of Barcelona, Bernat Metge, from the perspective of different religions and traditions (Catholic, Classical, Saracen doctrine and Christianity). The observation also makes it possible to calibrate the strong influence of the Mallorca Philosopher Ramon Llull, who is confirmed behind the origins of the humanist movement, as well as underlines the very peculiar techniques, the intensity of his critical sense and especially the intimate classicist bond. Still, he advances positions which are current issues.

Brigit G. FERGUSON

Published in Pleasure in the Middle Ages

Keywords: Art History, Emotion, Martyrdom, Sculpture, Thirteenth Century.

A late thirteenth-century Stoning of St. Stephen, currently in the Cathedral Museum in Mainz, Germany, shows the martyr smiling radiantly in the midst of his execution. In contrast to Stephen’s saintly bliss, his executioners scream in rage. The narrative of St. Stephen, from the Acts of the Apostles, reports that those present at Stephen’s trial ‘viderunt faciem eius tamquam faciem angeli [saw his face as if it had been the face of an angel]’ (Acts 6:15). Although the biblical story describes Stephen as crying out to God at the moment of his death, the makers of the Mainz relief applied the description of the saint as angelic – which they understood to mean that he smiled softly – to the martyrdom in order to highlight his joy at dying for Christ. Stephen’s calm joy makes him angelic, while the anger of the attackers makes them demonic. The Mainz relief is far from the only representation of a blissful saint in medieval art. Early Christian and medieval hagiography is full of saints who taunt their persecutors or are described as smiling while they die. This is also true, for example, in the story of St. Vincent. In contrast, the persecutors of these saints often experience debilitating, blinding rage. Drawing on visual and textual hagiographies, this paper explores the implications of martyrs’ smiles, arguing that their calm pleasure in the face of suffering both asserts the power of their belief in salvation and serves to disarm their persecutors. The contrast between calmly smiling saints and their immoderate enemies underlines the importance of emotional restraint for Christian virtue.

Wilson Coimbra LEMKE; Bento Silva SANTOS

Original title: O Protágoras, de Platão (c. 427-347 a. C.), em diálogo com os Escritos Éticos, de Santo Tomás de Aquino (1225-1274)

Published in The World of Tradition

Keywords: Dialectic, Philosophy, Plato, Saint Thomas Aquinas, Virtue Ethics.

In his dialogue on the Sophists, entitled Protagoras, Plato deals with the nature of virtue, basically discussing whether it is something teachable. Some scholars, however, have designated this dialogue as aporetic, that is, inconclusive. We must, therefore, try to answer those questions that Socrates and Protagoras may have left unsolved on that occasion. Now, most of these questions were taken up in some works by Plato’s most famous disciple and, later, resolved in the Ethical Writings, by Saint Thomas Aquinas, such as the “Treatises on the virtues” (Faith, Hope, Charity, Prudence, Justice, Fortitude and Temperance), contained in the Second Part of the Summa Theologica, the Disputed Questions on the Virtues, and the Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Hence, we must consider them here in the light of the great Aristotelian-Thomist synthesis. To do so, we use the scholastic method of disputatio, in which a quaestio is debated, structured in four articles, addressed by the Athenian philosopher to the great medieval Doctor. The article first discusses whether virtue is a science. The second, whether virtue can be taught. The third, whether virtue is one or multiple. And the fourth, if someone voluntarily acts badly.